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GOVERNING PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES 
TOM TYLER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of how to hold diverse groups together is central to many 
modern pluralistic societies. The article by Mnookin and Verbeke discusses the 
key issues that emerge in such efforts, using Belgium as an example.1 The 
question, well illustrated by the linguistic and cultural complexities of Belgium, 
is what social glue can hold together such diverse groups? In this comment, I 
discuss several social-psychological contributions to the question of managing 
diversity, with the hope that they provide some ideas useful to this general 
discussion. 
Societies can be held together in many ways. Historically, many groups were 
linked by a common history, common ethnicity, and common religious and 
social values. These societies shared a unified set of norms dictating right and 
wrong. Other groups have been held together by charismatic leaders who 
present a unifying vision. But modern pluralistic society, uniquely, accepts a 
diversity of views about what is appropriate and reasonable, which makes these 
forms of authority difficult to enact. The form of authority emerging in western 
democratic states has been, instead, authority based upon the processes of 
government: people recognize democratic procedures as legitimate and defer to 
authorities because of the manner in which they manage. This allows authority 
to be widely accepted in the face of diverse moral, cultural, or religious 
traditions. The key to the success of such a strategy is that legitimacy is based 
upon the fairness of the procedures used by authorities to govern rather than 
upon the substance of their decisions. This allows authorities to make decisions 
that are widely accepted even by those who disagree with them. 
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II 
WHAT MAKES A PROCEDURE FAIR? 
What makes a procedure fair in the eyes of the public? Four factors 
dominate evaluations of procedural justice.2 First, people want the opportunity 
to state their cases to the authorities.3 Second, people expect neutrality of the 
authority’s decision-making process.4 People also value the quality of their 
interpersonal treatment by the authorities, that is, whether they feel they are 
being treated with dignity and respect by legal authorities.5 Finally, people focus 
on cues that communicate information about the intentions and character of the 
legal authorities with whom they are dealing—trustworthiness.6 
Yuen Huo and I have directly compared the influence of these four factors 
and of outcome favorability and procedural-justice judgments on people’s 
overall rating of their personal experiences with legal authorities.7 The results 
indicated that each of the four factors was at least five times as important as 
outcome favorability in shaping judgments about the procedural justice of the 
experience.8 In other words, people’s judgments about whether justice was done 
are not strongly linked to their outcomes. Instead, they are linked to the process 
that produces those outcomes. 
Given the centrality of procedural justice to the exercise of legal authority, 
my concern is with factors shaping the importance of procedural justice. In a 
situation of the type Mnookin and Verbeke outline in their discussion of 
Belgium, it is such factors that may well determine the ability of a society to 
hold itself together. This comment focuses on two factors: identification and 
legitimacy. 
III 
IDENTIFICATION 
Most situations of conflict between groups, organizations, and societies 
involve groups that are connected in some ways, but that are also distinct. 
Those groups can view themselves as being in conflict, or they can view 
themselves as cooperating. Diversity imposes special problems for group 
leaders. This is the case because people’s loyalties to a larger (that is, 
superordinate) group often conflict with their loyalties to ethnic, religious, 
ideological, or other subgroups. For the larger group to be viable, leaders must 
be able to gain support for common policies from the members of the various 
groups within society. 
 
 2. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 121 (2000). 
 3. Id. at 121–22. 
 4. Id. at 122. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 49–58 (2002). 
 8. Id. at 58. 
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Many social policies concerning immigrants and minorities have been based 
upon untested assumptions about the consequences of different forms of loyalty 
for the well-being of the state. For example, in the United States, the strong 
emphasis on assimilation is based upon the belief that subgroup loyalties 
threaten political and social stability.9 In general, loyalty to ethnic and cultural 
subgroups is discouraged, while becoming an American is viewed as the central 
goal.10 
Recently, social-science research has suggested that superordinate 
identification is important in shaping people’s political attitudes and actions, 
whereas subgroup identification plays little role in relationships to 
government.11 This finding suggests that, in many situations, it may well be 
possible for societies to be tolerant of strong subgroup loyalties because it is the 
level of identification with the superordinate group that shapes the basis of 
deference.12 
But why does superordinate identification matter? We can generally 
identify two reasons that people might accept decisions and obey rules. One 
reason is instrumental: people might do so when it favors them. A second 
reason is relational: they might do so when they view the authorities and 
institutions involved as making decisions in fair ways. Clearly, authorities would 
rather have their constituents reacting to them relationally, since it gives them 
the ability to better manage conflicts. The key finding is that when people 
identify with the superordinate group, they react to decisions relationally.13 
When they do not, they react instrumentally.14 
So, in the studies by Smith and by Huo and myself, minorities who identified 
with the superordinate group decided whether to defer to rules and authorities, 
based upon the manner of their treatment by those authorities.15 Among 
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 11. For an examination of the basis of deference to decisions made by authorities in conflict 
situations, see Huo et al., supra note 10, at 40–45. The argument has been extended to interactions 
between ethnic groups and legal authorities. See, e.g., Huo, supra note 9, at 336–48; Heather J. Smith & 
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EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 171, 171–200 (1996). 
 12. Huo et al., supra note 10, at 40–45, examined the basis of deference to the decisions made by 
authorities in conflict situations. Smith & Tyler, supra note 11, at 171–200, and Huo, supra note 9, at 
336–48, extend this basic argument to interactions between minority group members and legal 
authorities. In all cases the finding is the same. 
 13. Huo, supra note 9, at 345. 
 14. Smith & Tyler, supra note 11, at 193–94. 
 15. Huo et al., supra note 10, at 44–45; Smith & Tyler, supra note 11, at 185–86, 197–98; see also 
John E. Transue, Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes: American National 
Identity as a Uniting Force, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 78, 78–91 (2007) (suggesting that making superordinate 
identity relevant increased support for tax increases); Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective 
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minorities with high superordinate identification, those treated fairly while 
decisions were made about the implementation of rules accepted the decisions.16 
When identification was low, acceptance was linked to the favorability of 
decisions.17 
The centrality of superordinate identification matters because we know a 
great deal about how to create and maintain superordinate identification among 
immigrants, minorities, and others. In particular, research emphasizes two 
themes. First, superordinate identification can be strengthened by creating 
opportunities for the members of different groups to work across group 
boundaries to pursue commonly beneficial goals.18 Ever since the classic 
Robbers Cave experiments by Sherif,19 the importance of interdependence has 
been emphasized. This interdependence element of superordinate identification 
is emphasized in the common in-group identity model.20 Second, when people 
experience fair procedures on the part of group authorities, they more strongly 
identify with the group.21 This includes fair procedures for decisionmaking and 
fair interpersonal treatment, that is, treatment with dignity and respect, 
acknowledgment of rights, et cetera. 
IV 
LEGITIMACY 
A second mechanism that might be used to encourage cooperation is to 
activate people’s feelings of responsibility and obligation to obey authorities.22 
Legitimacy is the property of an authority or institution that leads people to feel 
that that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed.23 It 
represents an “acceptance by people of the need to bring their behavior into 
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 17. Huo et al., supra note 10, at 45; Smith, supra note 11, at 197–98; Tyler & Degoey, supra note 15, 
at 493. 
 18. Tyler & Degoey, supra note 15, at 493–94. 
 19. MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: THE ROBBERS CAVE 
EXPERIMENT 208–11(1961). 
 20. Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Across Cultural Divides: The Value of a Superordinate Identity, in 
CULTURAL DIVIDES 173, 182 (Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller eds., 1999). 
 21. TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS 194–96 (2000). 
 22. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND 
COMPLIANCE 19 (2006); see also Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and 
Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 375–400 (2006) [hereinafter Tyler, Psychological 
Perspectives] (discussing legitimacy and how it affects personal feelings of obligation to defer to 
authority); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & 
JUST. 283, 307–310 (2003). 
 23. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 22, at 375.  
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line with the dictates of an external authority.”24 This feeling of obligation is 
linked not simply to the authorities’ possession of instruments of reward or 
coercion, but also to properties of the authority that lead people to feel it is 
entitled to be obeyed.25 As was true with identification, procedural justice is a 
key antecedent of legitimacy.26 Hence, procedural justice in the exercise of 
authority both increases identification with superordinate authorities and 
promotes legitimacy. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Two factors—superordinate identity and legitimacy—aid in the 
management of conflicts between groups, and both are encouraged by 
procedural justice. Belgium, whose diversity motivated this discussion, is, from 
a procedural-justice perspective, a fragile society. The public is largely excluded 
from decisionmaking, which is primarily done by elites.27 Hence, the authorities 
have very little legitimacy and must rely upon a complex arrangement of 
providing benefits to different groups as the basis upon which they rule. Such an 
arrangement is inherently unstable and at risk, which suggests that Belgium 
itself is at risk. 
Nonetheless, there is nothing inherently unstable about pluralistic societies. 
We know a lot about how to enhance political stability via the mechanisms of 
the fair exercise of authority, political and legal. By enhancing their own 
legitimacy through such mechanisms and by strengthening the superordinate 
identification of multiple and diverse groups, those in authority can enhance the 
loyalty of those groups to the larger society and to the authorities, themselves. 
This, in turn, facilitates governance. 
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